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Mending a Monumental Mountain:
Resolving Two Critical Circuit Splits Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act for the Sake of
Logic, Unity, and the Mentally Disabled
I. INTRODUCTION
Welcome to Mount ADA. Now please picture yourself in a
group of fifty hikers on this large and diverse mountain.1 You have a
guide that is responsible for leading you and your colleagues along
the tricky trails and over the rocky terrain. A number of hikers in
your group—ten to be exact2—need special assistance in order to
successfully navigate the mountain, and the guide has provided them
with the necessary accommodations. As you make your way along
the mountain’s paths, you encounter some difficulties. You feel
weighed down by unhappy thoughts, and, as a result, your
relationship with your guide deteriorates. In fact, your melancholic
mood makes it difficult to communicate and work with most of the
people in the group. The guide considers you to be substantially
limited in your ability to interact with others and questions your
capability to continue the hike. You, however, feel confident in your
abilities to perform the necessary tasks involved with the hike—
provided that the guide relieves you of duties that require significant
interaction with the other hikers. What should be done? Must the
guide provide the accommodations necessary for you to remain with
the group? Can she send you packing?3
1. This thinly veiled parable illustrates some of the major issues and challenges in the
employment arena under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
2. This number is representative of the datum from the United States Census Bureau,
which states that about one in five U.S. residents suffer from at least one disability. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, FACTS FOR FEATURES (2003), http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/2003/cb03ff-10.html. Additionally, only about thirty percent of individuals
suffering from a major disability are currently working. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS): PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, http://www.dol.gov/dolfaq/
go-dol-faq.asp?faqid=66&faqsub=Statistics&faqtop=People+with+Disabilities&topicid.
3. Before answering such questions, it is important for one to consider not only the
point of view of the mentally impaired hiker, but also that of the guide and other hikers on the
mountain. John Erskine wrote, “[T]he body travels more easily than the mind, and until we
have limbered up our imagination we continue to think as though we had stayed home. We
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In the context of the workplace environment, the answers to
these and other questions are to be found by looking to the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990.4 Congress enacted
the ADA in an attempt to provide comprehensive protection against
discrimination for individuals with real or perceived disabilities. Title
I of the ADA states that employers are prohibited from
discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities in all
facets of employment.5 In addition to the requirement of equal
treatment, the ADA requires employers “to make ‘reasonable
accommodations’ or adjustments in the workplace not offered to
applicants or employees without disabilities, which permit the person
with a disability to perform the essential functions of his or her job.”6
Thus, an employer that is subject to the requirements of the ADA is
prohibited from discriminating against qualified individuals with
disabilities and is required to provide reasonable accommodations
that do not amount to an undue hardship.7
The courts’ application of Title I of the ADA has, at times, been
considerably inconsistent.8 One significant fissure in the ADA
mountain involves the question of whether an individual’s ability to
interact with others is a major life activity under the ADA.9 This is an
important issue because unless an individual is substantially limited in
a major life activity (i.e., seeing, hearing, or walking), that individual
does not qualify as disabled under the ADA, and an employer has no
have not really budged a step until we take up residence in someone else’s point of view.”
JOHN ERSKINE, THE COMPLETE LIFE 192 (1943).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000).
5. See id. § 12112(a).
6. Leslie Goddard, Searching for Balance in the ADA: Recent Developments in the Legal
and Practical Issues of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 227, 230 (1999); see also
42 U.S.C. § 12111.
7. Undue hardship is defined as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense,
when considered in light of . . . the nature and cost of the accommodation[,] . . . the overall
financial resources of the facility or facilities involved[,] . . . the overall financial resources of
the covered entity[, and] . . . the type of operation or operations of the covered entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12111.
8. Some even view the current ADA employment landscape as warranting action by the
mountain’s creator—Congress. In 2004 the National Council on Disability (NCD) published a
report entitled Righting the ADA, in which the NCD analyzed “problematic rulings” involving
the ADA and offered suggestions for legislative action that would “restore the ADA to its
original intent.” THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 1 (2004),
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/righting_ada.htm.
9. “Interacting with others” refers precisely to one’s ability to communicate and
interact with others.
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responsibility to accommodate that individual.10 Although most
circuits have not directly addressed this issue, the First Circuit and
the Ninth Circuit have come to different conclusions, creating the
“interacting with others divide.”11 In August 2005, the Eleventh
Circuit expanded another critical divide when it rejected the
precedent of four sister circuits and joined the First, Third, and
Tenth Circuits in holding that the ADA requires employers to
reasonably accommodate those employees they perceive as
disabled.12 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision deepened what one might
call the “accommodation divide.” This split in authority is significant
because a mentally impaired individual will often base his
discrimination claim on the fact that the employer perceived him as
disabled, and if a court does not recognize a duty to accommodate
such an individual, that person has no recourse under the ADA.
These two splits in authority impact a significant number of
discrimination claims and have created considerable confusion in the
employment arena.13 The Supreme Court should quickly act to
resolve these disputes and should do so by looking to the plain
language of the ADA, congressional intent, Supreme Court
precedent, and explicit guidance from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). If and when the Court
engages in this analysis, the Court should hold that interacting with
others is a major life activity and that employers are responsible to
accommodate those individuals they perceive as disabled. Such
holdings represent the most logical interpretation of the ADA and
will create a desirable unity among the lower courts. Perhaps most
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
11. See Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that
the ability to interact with others is a “skill to be prized” but should not be recognized as a
“major life activity” for purposes of the ADA). But see McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192
F.3d 1226, 1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the ability to get along with others as a
“major life activity” under the ADA). Further, both the Eighth and Fourth Circuits have
expressed doubt as to whether the ability to interact with others is a major life activity. See
Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 1999); Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263
F.3d 95, 101 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001).
12. See D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005). See infra
Parts III and IV for a discussion of this circuit split.
13. “Recent EEOC data show more discrimination cases involve mental impairments
(more than 20 percent) than any other disabilities category . . . .” Lyda Phillips, Employment
Discrimination—Disability: Accommodating the Problem Employee: No Easy Answers, Experts
and Courts Agree, 73 U.S. L. WK. 2275 (2004).
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important, such a course of action is critical for the liberation and
protection of many individuals suffering from mental illness.
The “interacting with others” and “accommodation” divides
impact individuals suffering from mental impairments14 more than
any other segment of the disabled community. This is due to the
following: an individual must have a disability to be protected under
the ADA, and whether an individual has a disability hinges on
whether that person is substantially limited in a major life activity.
Unlike their physically disabled counterparts who have disabilities
that involve limitations in major life activities such as seeing, hearing,
speaking, or walking, individuals with mental impairments are often
left to argue that their limitation lies with their inability to interact
with others. Therefore, unless a court recognizes interacting with
others as a major life activity, many mentally impaired individuals will
not be “disabled” as defined by the ADA and will remain
unprotected under the Act. Courts that refuse to recognize
interacting with others as a major life activity unjustly discriminate
against the mentally impaired. This occurs simply because their
impairment is lesser known and their limitations are less apparent.
Even if a court recognizes interacting with others as a major life
activity, many mentally impaired individuals will still fall outside the
protections of the ADA because such employees are forced to allege
discrimination based on a “perceived disability”; and, as mentioned
above, about half of the circuits do not require employers to
reasonably accommodate individuals “perceived” as disabled.
Consequently, a mentally impaired individual that qualifies as
“disabled” due to the fact that he is perceived as substantially limited
in his ability to interact with others is still denied the right to a
reasonable accommodation that would allow this individual to secure
a job or continue to work.
Part II of this Comment provides some background on the
framework of the Americans with Disabilities Act, focusing on those
sections of the Act pertinent to this Comment. Part III analyzes the
circuit splits: first, it looks at the leading case on each side of the
“interacting with others divide”; and second, it looks at some of the
major cases representing the “accommodation divide.” This

14. Mental impairments include anxiety disorder, depression, bipolar disorder, and
schizophrenia. Of the discrimination claims that involve mental impairments, anxiety disorder
is the most common, followed by depression. Id.
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discussion illustrates both the importance of a unified rule and
provides the necessary background to understanding the impact of
these issues on persons suffering from mental impairments. Part IV
argues that the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit splits by
recognizing the interaction with others as a major life activity and
recognizing an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate
individuals with perceived disabilities. Such holdings are entirely
consistent with the text and purpose of the ADA and, as Part IV
illustrates, are critical to the protection of persons suffering from
mental impairments. However, even if the Court resolves the splits as
suggested, Part IV shows that the realities of the present work
environment are such that many mentally disabled individuals will
not be protected under the current rubric of the ADA. Nevertheless,
there appear to be additional things that can be done to help bring
Congress’s goal of a discrimination-free work environment closer to
a reality. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act after finding
that some forty-three million Americans had one or more physical or
mental disabilities15 and that discrimination against individuals with
disabilities continued in areas such as employment, public
accommodations,
education,
housing,
transportation,
16
communication, health services, and recreation. In an attempt to
cure this “serious and pervasive social problem,”17 Congress enacted
this legislation to “provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities” and to “provide clear strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.”18 Although the ADA was the first piece of
legislation to provide comprehensive protection for the disabled,19 it

15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000). Congress’s inclusion of this figure has recently
come under fire by the disabled community due to the Supreme Court’s usage of the figure to
justify its conclusion that Congress desired a narrow interpretation of “disability.” See
Disability Agency Urges Congress To ‘Right’ ADA Through Legislation, 73 U.S. L. WK. 2326
(2004).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
17. Id. § 12101(a)(2).
18. Id. § 12101(b)(1)–(2).
19. Goddard, supra note 6, at 228.
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was not the first significant disability legislation. The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 prohibited federally funded programs or activities from
discriminating against the disabled.20 The Rehabilitation Act had a
noteworthy impact on the ADA21—indeed the ADA incorporated
some of the Rehabilitation Act’s primary definitions nearly word-forword.22 This is significant because the Supreme Court interpreted
many of the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act that were eventually
incorporated into the ADA.
Title I of the ADA covers employment discrimination.23 It
“applies to all private employers who have employed fifteen or more
employees for a minimum of twenty calendar weeks within the
current or preceding calendar year.”24 Title I applies to state and
local governments, employment agencies, and labor unions.25 Most
courts recognize that an individual makes out a prima facie
discrimination case under Title I by showing four things: (1) the
individual’s employer is subject to the ADA; (2) the individual
suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (3) the
individual could perform the essential function of the job with or
without reasonable accommodation; and (4) the individual suffered
adverse employment action because of the disability.26 These steps
may appear on their face to be clear, but the interpretations of the
ADA have been far from lucid. To better understand the issues
underlying the two circuit splits and their impact on the mentally
disabled, the following Sections examine some of the ADA’s key
terminology and definitions.

20. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
21. For more on the Rehabilitation Act and its influence on the ADA, see Timothy J.
McFarlin, If They Ask for a Stool . . . Recognizing Reasonable Accommodation for Employees
“Regarded as” Disabled, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 927 (2005).
22. Most notably—at least for purposes of this Comment—is the ADA’s near word-forword adoption of the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of “handicapped individual,” which as
amended read: “[A]ny person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment,
or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also
Rehabilitation Act, 87 Stat. at 361.
23. Because this Comment deals exclusively with employment discrimination, it is only
necessary to discuss Title I of the ADA—the sole Title covering employment issues.
24. Nancy L. Abell et al., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Rights, Responsibilities,
and Recent Results, A.L.I.-A.B.A., Sept. 19, 2000, at 249; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a)
(2000).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
26. See, e.g., Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2003).
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A. “Disability” Under the ADA

Congress defined “disability” in the ADA as “(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”27 Thus, an
individual qualifies as disabled under the ADA in any one of three
ways: (1) having a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities;28 (2) having a record of a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities;29 or (3) being regarded as having a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.30 An individual is disabled for purposes of the ADA if that
individual falls under any one of the three definitions.31 Embedded
within these definitions are numerous terms of art—“physical or
mental impairment,” “substantially limits,” and “major life
activities.” The outcome of many cases hinges on the court’s
interpretation of these terms, and the following discussion contains a
brief analysis of these terms. Because the circuit splits are primarily
dealing with individuals asserting discrimination based on perceived
disabilities, a deeper analysis of the third disability definition—
“regarded as” disabled—will follow the analysis of the key terms.
1. Physical or mental impairment
At the heart of the disability definitions lies the phrase “physical
and mental impairment.”32 The EEOC defines physical impairment
as “[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the

27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
28. Courts describe this as the “actual disability” definition. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila.
Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 762–66 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
1725 (2005).
29. Courts refer to this as the “disability of record” definition.
30. Courts deem this the “regarded as disabled” definition. See, e.g., D’Angelo v.
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005).
31. See, e.g., id. Due to the complexity involved in answering the question of whether an
individual is protected under the ADA and because the focus of this Comment involves
questions regarding reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, a thorough analysis of
this topic is not feasible. For a more detailed analysis of whether an individual is protected
under the ADA, see Abell, supra note 24.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine.”33 Mental impairment is defined as “[a]ny mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.”34 Courts have construed the disability definition to
protect individuals with a wide range of disabilities spanning from
heart conditions, high blood pressure, AIDS, epilepsy, and diabetes,
to hearing, speech and mobility impairment, and back problems.35
Individuals with temporary, short-term injuries or illnesses are not
covered.36 Also, “impairments” excluded from coverage include
recreational drug use, homosexuality and bisexuality, compulsive
gambling, kleptomania, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism,
and voyeurism.37 In 1997 the EEOC issued guidelines designed to
facilitate the full enforcement of the ADA with respect to individuals
alleging employment discrimination based on psychiatric disability.38
This EEOC report shows how the issue of psychiatric disabilities in
the workplace has been, and continues to be, a complicated issue
that affects a significant number of people. Proving that an individual
is physically or mentally impaired is alone insufficient for that person
to be protected under the Act. One must also show that the
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.
2. Major life activities
Before an impairment can rise to the level of a disability, a court
must determine that the impairment substantially limits one or more
major life activities.39 The ADA does not provide a definition of what
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2004).
34. Id. § 1630.2(h)(2).
35. Abell, supra note 24, at 252.
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12211. These “impairments” are obviously not considered as such for
large segments of society, as evidenced by their exclusion from the statute.
38. 3 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW
AND REGULATIONS § 73:6 (1997) [hereinafter GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW]. In addition to
its purpose of facilitating full enforcement, the EEOC published the guidelines to “respond to
questions and concerns expressed by individuals with psychiatric disabilities regarding the
ADA; and answer questions posed by employers about how principles of the ADA analysis
apply in the context of psychiatric disabilities.” Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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constitutes a major life activity. Consequently, courts have had the
final say on which life activities are “major” under the ADA. The
EEOC has provided guidance and regulations in an attempt to direct
courts in this area of law.40 EEOC regulations initially provided the
following nonexhaustive list of major life activities: caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, speaking, walking,
breathing, learning, and working.41 In 1997 the EEOC published an
enforcement guidance that added thinking, concentrating, and
interacting with others to the nonexhaustive list of major life
activities.42 Although courts disagree as to the level of recognition
that is to be given to these latter activities, they have also expanded
the list to include the activities of reproduction, sleeping, and sexual
relations.43 The Supreme Court provided a little insight into its
reasoning concerning what activities might qualify as “major” for
purposes of the ADA in Bragdon v. Abbott. The Court noted that
“the touchstone for determining an activity’s inclusion under the
statutory rubric [of the ADA] is its significance.”44 In the 2002 case
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the
Supreme Court found that a major life activity must be “central to
daily life.”45 Similar to Abbott, “this language in Toyota fails to set
forth a clear standard for the lower courts to apply in determining
whether a particular activity is major for the purposes of the ADA.”46
3. Substantially limits
The last hurdle in the process of proving disability is a finding
that the impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity.47 In
determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity, courts look at the nature and severity of the impairment and

40. “The formal regulations (regulations), which have been officially promulgated by
the EEOC, are entitled to great deference while the informal guidelines (guidelines or
guidance) represent unofficial statements that are not binding on courts.” Mark DeLoach,
Can’t We All Just Get Along?: The Treatment of “Interacting with Others” as a Major Life
Activity in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1321 (2004).
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2004).
42. GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6(3).
43. See Abbott, 524 U.S. at 624 (recognizing reproduction as a major life activity).
44. Id. at 638.
45. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
46. DeLoach, supra note 40, at 1324.
47. See GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6.
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the duration or expected duration of the impairment.48 Courts have
also evaluated the permanent or long term impact of the impairment.
“The determination that a particular individual has a substantially
limiting impairment should be based on information about how the
impairment affects that individual and not on generalizations about
the condition.”49 In the 1999 case Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
the Supreme Court held that courts must consider mitigating factors
when deciding if the impairment is a substantial limitation.50
Therefore, post-Sutton plaintiffs who mitigate their impairments may
find themselves unshielded from discriminatory actions because they
will not be considered “disabled” under the ADA. The Sutton
decision “raised the bar for claims under all three [parts of] the
disability definition”51 and has far-reaching effects on medicated
persons suffering from psychiatric impairments.
4. Perceived disabilities
When an employer perceives an employee as disabled, as having a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities, that employee is “regarded as disabled.”
Employees can fall under the “regarded as disabled” disability
definition in three circumstances:
[The individual] (1) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that
does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a
covered entity as constituting such limitation;
(2) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others
towards such impairment; or

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475, 481–83 (1999) (holding that
plaintiffs were not substantially limited by their poor eyesight because corrective measures gave
them twenty-twenty vision).
51. Michael D. Reisman, Note, Traveling “to the Farthest Reaches of the ADA,” or
Taking Aim at Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Perceived Disability?, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2121, 2135 (2005).
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(3) [h]as none of the impairments defined in [this regulation] but
is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting
impairment.52

This language shows that the “regarded as” definition of disability
focuses on the “perceptions about the individual, not the individual’s
actual condition.”53 By focusing on the perception of others, the
third prong recognizes “that society’s accumulated myths and fears
about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment.”54 This definition
functions to punish employers that take discriminatory action against
the disabled, or those they perceive as disabled, and also strikes at the
discriminatory attitudes that thwart an individual’s ability to work.55
“These three categories should be seen as a guide to recognizing
that employer misperceptions can result in discrimination in a variety
of circumstances, and courts have used them to this end.”56
B. Qualified Individual and Reasonable Accommodation
In addition to having a recognized disability under the ADA, an
individual who seeks protection under the Act must be qualified for
the job at issue.57 A “qualified individual”58 under the ADA is a
person with a disability who can perform the essential function of the
employment position that such person occupies, or desires to
occupy, with or without reasonable accommodation.59 If such a
person cannot perform the essential functions of the position at
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2004).
53. Reisman, supra note 51, at 2127–28 (“[C]laims ‘regarded as disabled in the major
life activity of working’ should be the primary, if not exclusive, basis for membership in the
ADA’s protected class for individuals with less visible impairments.”).
54. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). Congress
pointed to the Arline decision as explaining the proper purpose of the “regarded as” prong
and “adopted the Supreme Court’s analysis of the ‘regarded as’ definition (under the Rehab
Act) in introducing the ADA.” McFarlin, supra note 21, at 942; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101485 (III), at 453 (1990).
55. McFarlin, supra note 21, at 943.
56. Id. at 940.
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2000).
58. For a comprehensive discussion of the question of who is a “qualified individual” for
purposes of Title I of the ADA, see William H. Danne, Annotation, Who Is “Qualified
Individual” Under Americans with Disabilities Act Provisions Defining, and Extending
Protection Against Employment Discrimination to Qualified Individual with Disability, 146
A.L.R. FED. 1 (1998).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
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issue, the employer need not hire or retain that person.60 The
EEOC, through a promulgated regulation, defines a qualified
individual with a disability as “an individual with a disability who
satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other jobrelated requirements of the employment position such individual
holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such
position.”61 Embedded in this definition is a two-step analysis that
courts have consistently followed to determine whether individuals
are qualified under the ADA:62
Consistent with the approach embodied in an [EEOC] regulation
(29 C.F.R. §1630.29(m)), the courts have engaged in a
fundamental 2-step analysis in resolving whether one is a qualified
individual with a disability under ADA Title I, the first step is to
determine if the individual satisfies the prerequisites for the
position, such as possessing the appropriate educational
background, employment experience, skills, licenses, and the like,
and the second step is to determine whether the individual can
perform the essential functions of the position, with or without
reasonable accommodation.63

A court makes the determination of an employee’s “qualified” status
under the ADA at the time of the adverse employment action.64 The
EEOC defines essential functions as “the fundamental job duties of
the employment position the individual with a disability holds or

60. Id. § 12112.
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2004).
62. See, e.g., Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 746 (2005) (recognizing that courts employ a two-part inquiry when
determining whether a person is a qualified individual under the ADA, looking first to whether
the employee satisfied the employer’s legitimate selection criteria for the position, and then
looking to whether the employee was capable, with or without accommodation, of performing
the job’s essential functions); Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2003)
(noting that an employee establishes the “qualified individual” element by satisfying the
requisite job-related requirements of the position and performing the essential functions of the
position, with or without reasonable accommodation); Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst.,
Inc., 209 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that the examination of an employee’s “qualified”
status involves asking whether the employee could perform the essential functions of the job,
and if not, whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable him to
perform those functions).
63. Danne, supra note 58, § 2(a).
64. Id. § 5(a) (citing Morton v. GTE North Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex.
1996)).
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desires.”65 The ADA requires that courts consider the employer’s
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential.66 The qualified
individual analysis is especially pertinent for people with mental
disabilities because interacting with others is often an essential
function of the job. The question then becomes whether there is an
accommodation that would enable a mentally impaired person to be
able to interact with others.
Employers under the ADA have an affirmative duty to reasonably
accommodate “otherwise qualified individual[s]” so that these
individuals can perform the essential functions of their employment
positions.67 The ADA defines reasonable accommodation by
providing possible examples:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities.68

The EEOC has stressed that employers should initiate an informal
and interactive process with the disabled individual to “identify the
precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those
limitations.”69 However, the ADA does not require employers to
accommodate such individuals if such accommodation would result
in an undue hardship. The ADA defines an undue hardship as “an
action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in
light of . . . the nature and cost of the accommodation . . . the
overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved . . . the
overall financial resources of the covered entity . . . [and] the type of
operation or operations of the covered entity.”70

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Id. § 12111(9).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A)–(B).
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C. The EEOC
To fully analyze the circuit splits, and to really engage in any
serious employment law discussion, it is necessary to briefly discuss
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
some of its actions pertaining to the mentally impaired. Congress has
given the EEOC the primary responsibility of enforcing the
employment-related portions of the ADA.71 In 1997 the EEOC
published enforcement guidelines designed to “facilitate the full
enforcement of the ADA with respect to individuals alleging
employment discrimination based on psychiatric disability.”72 Among
the notable elements of this guidance were the EEOC’s additions to
the list of major life activities. In addition to the list of enumerated
activities in the ADA, the EEOC added the life activities of
“learning, thinking, concentrating, [and] interacting with others.”73
The EEOC qualified this latter activity in a footnote where it stated
that “[i]nteracting with others, as a major life activity, is not
substantially limited just because an individual is irritable or has some
trouble getting along with a supervisor or coworker.”74 Despite this
limiting language, the EEOC suggests an expansion from the
traditional scope of major life activities.
Due to the structure of the ADA disability definition, many
people that might be considered disabled in a colloquial sense would
not qualify as disabled under the ADA. Clearly, individuals suffering
from a mental impairment face challenges and discrimination equal
to that which their physically impaired brothers and sisters face.
However, unless courts recognize “interacting with others” as a
major life activity, the mentally impaired may face the discrimination
without the protection of the ADA.
III. EXPLORING THE DIVIDES
This Part describes the current state of the law as affected by the
circuit splits; namely, the split in authority involving some courts’
recognition of interacting with others as a major life activity and the
courts’ recognition of an employer’s duty to reasonably
71. Other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs, also have responsibilities under those segments of the law.
72. GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 73:6 n.15.
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accommodate those perceived as disabled. To best explain this
division, the following Sections look at the leading cases on each side
of the “interacting with others” and “accommodation” divides. This
discussion illustrates the importance of a unified rule and provides
the background necessary to understand the impact of these issues
on persons suffering from mental impairments.
A. The Interacting with Others Divide
The First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have both directly
addressed the question of whether one’s interaction with others is a
major life activity for purposes of the ADA. Their conflicting
holdings have created the interacting-with-others divide—a divide
that left unattended will certainly grow deeper. This Section analyzes
these two leading cases to sharpen the focus of this debate and to set
the stage for a discussion of whose interpretation is correct.75 The
First Circuit, in Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., did not recognize
the ability to interact with others as a major life activity.76 In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in McAlindin v. County of San Diego,
held that interacting with others is a major life activity for purposes
of the ADA.77
1. Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc.
In January 1997, the First Circuit heard Soileau v. Guilford of
Maine, Inc. and refused to recognize the “ability to get along with
others” as a major life activity.78 The court found the concept to be
unworkable as a definition and different in kind to the more
generally recognized major life activities of walking and breathing.79
Randall Soileau began working for Guilford in 1979.80 In 1992
Soileau started working for Earnest, a new supervisor, but the
ensuing relationship between Soileau and Earnest deteriorated.81 A
dispute subsequently arose between Earnest and Soileau when

75. See discussion infra Part IV (including an analysis of “who got it right”).
76. 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997).
77. 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999).
78. Soileau, 105 F.3d at 12. This case was decided prior to the release of the 1997
EEOC enforcement guidance referenced infra Part II.C.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id.
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Soileau refused to train a coworker as directed by Earnest.82 The next
day Earnest issued Soileau a “Final Written Warning/Suspension”
that “listed four performance deficiencies, ordered a two day
suspension, and required Soileau to evaluate his own performance
and come back with an improvement plan.”83 Stressed by the final
warning, Soileau told Earnest of his previous suicidal state and that
he was afraid he might once again be falling ill. This was the first
time Earnest had heard of Soileau’s condition.84 Soileau went to see
a psychologist a week later.85 The doctor diagnosed Soileau as
suffering from a bout of depression. Soileau told Earnest that he was
having a difficult time interacting with other people and Earnest
agreed that Soileau would be temporarily relieved from certain duties
that aggravated his illness.86
On April 12, the doctor provided Guilford with a letter that
requested Soileau’s duties to be “restricted so as to avoid
responsibilities which require[d] significant interaction with other
employees.”87 On April 21, Earnest and Soileau met to discuss
Soileau’s employment situation. Earnest indicated that he believed
the new accommodations satisfied the doctor’s recommendations.88
However, because Soileau had failed to provide Earnest with an
improvement plan as requested in the warning, Earnest fired Soileau
a day later. Earnest informed Soileau that he had been fired as a
result of his lack of improvement in the four problem areas and
because he failed to submit an improvement plan.89
Soileau filed an ADA discrimination claim in federal court against
Guilford arguing that he was significantly limited in the major life
activity of interacting with others.90 The district court granted
summary judgment for Guilford and held, among other things, that
Soileau’s dysthemia did not substantially impair a major life activity.
Reviewing the case de novo, the First Circuit found that Soileau had
a mental impairment but refused to recognize the inability to work

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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with others as impairing a major life activity.91 Therefore, Soileau was
not “disabled” under the ADA because he failed to show that his
impairment substantially limited a major life activity.
The court noted that the “concept of ‘ability to get along with
others’ is remarkably elastic, perhaps so much so as to make it
unworkable as a definition.”92 Moreover, even if courts recognized
the ability to interact with others as a major life activity, Soileau was
not sufficiently limited because the two documented bouts of
depression occurred at times when most people would feel stress—
following a break-up with a girlfriend and criticism from a
supervisor.93 The court described the ability to get along with others
as a “skill to be prized . . . [but] different in kind from breathing or
walking.”94 However, “a more narrowly defined concept going to
essential attributes of human communication could, in a particular
setting, be understood to be a major life activity.” Nevertheless, the
court saw no need to address this question in its opinion95 and felt
uncomfortable imposing duties on employers for an “amorphous”
concept.96
Two years after the Soileau decision, the Ninth Circuit addressed
the question of whether interacting with others is major life activity
under the ADA, and it came to a different conclusion than the First
Circuit.
2. McAlindin v. County of San Diego
In 1999 the Ninth Circuit decided McAlindin v. County of San
Diego and held that interacting with others is a major life activity
because it is a significant activity that the average person can perform
with little or no difficulty.97
Richard McAlindin worked for the County of San Diego’s
Housing and Community Development Department for more than

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The court found that “Soileau’s alleged inability to interact with others came
and went and was triggered by vicissitudes of life which are normally stressful for ordinary
people—losing a girlfriend or being criticized by a supervisor.” Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234–35 (9th Cir. 1999).
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ten years.98 McAlindin suffered from and received treatment for
anxiety disorders, panic disorders, and somatoform disorders.99 In
early 1989, McAlindin was promoted and took on various stressful
duties.100 During a meeting with his supervisor, McAlindin allegedly
became agitated and shouted in an accusatory manner. He was
granted leave due to “work stress” and, as a result, obtained workers
compensation.101 In May 1992, McAlindin again took leave for
stress-related disability, during which time “he repeatedly requested
through his attorney a transfer to a different job as a ‘reasonable
accommodation’ required by the ADA.”102 The County agreed to
place his name on the transfer list but would not make special efforts
to guarantee a transfer.103
At the request of the County, McAlindin visited another doctor
in the summer of 1993 who also diagnosed him with anxiety and
panic disorders but felt that he could return to his job in three to six
weeks with proper treatment.104 When McAlindin returned to work,
he felt that his supervisors treated him drastically worse. A supervisor
gave McAlindin a written warning for sleeping at work despite his
explanation that his prescribed medications made him drowsy.105
Additionally, McAlindin complained about “not receiving adequate
training to help him adapt to the changing technologies in the
department.”106 Though he retained his position, McAlindin filed an
ADA discrimination claim against the County and his supervisors,
and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
County.107 Although the district court found that McAlindin had a
mental impairment, it concluded that he was not substantially
limited in any major life activity.108 The Ninth Circuit reversed.109
Although McAlindin had not specifically alleged disability based
on his limited ability to interact with others, the Ninth Circuit found
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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enough evidence to support such a conclusion and further held that
interacting with others is a major life activity under the ADA.110 As
support for its holding, the court pointed to Supreme Court and
other circuit precedent as well as to the 1997 EEOC Enforcement
Guidance concerning psychiatric disabilities.111 The Ninth Circuit
noted that in Bragdon v. Abbott the Supreme Court found that the
term “major life activity” was very broad and denoted “comparative
importance,” suggesting that “the touchstone for determining an
activity’s inclusion under the [ADA] rubric is its significance.”112 The
court also noted that the Tenth Circuit supported a broad definition
of “major life activity” in its decision Pack v. Kmart, Inc.,113 where it
held that “a major life activity also must be ‘a basic activity that the
average person in the general population can perform with little or
no difficulty.’”114
The Ninth Circuit found “interacting with others” to fit
comfortably within the Act’s broad definition of major life activity. It
viewed interacting with others as “an essential, regular function, like
walking and breathing.”115 The court dismissed the First Circuit’s
concern that the “ability to get along with others” was too vague by
noting that the ADA text contained nothing about vagueness as a
test for determining “major life activities.”116 Moreover, the court
believed interacting with others to be no vaguer than “caring for
oneself.”117 The Ninth Circuit did stipulate, however, that “a plaintiff
must show that his ‘relations with others were characterized on a
regular basis by severe problems, for example, consistently high levels
of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to communicate when
necessary.’”118
Before analyzing which of these two cases was decided correctly,
an exploration of the accommodation divide is in order.

110. Id. at 1233–35.
111. Id. at 1233.
112. Id. (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998)).
113. Pack v. Kmart, Inc., 166 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 1999).
114. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Pack, 166 F.3d at 1305).
115. Id. at 1234.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1235 (noting that the Fifth Circuit had defined caring for oneself as including
“everything from driving and grooming to feeding oneself and cleaning one’s home”).
118. Id.
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B. The Accommodation Divide
Most circuit courts have directly addressed the question of
whether an employer is required to reasonably accommodate those
individuals perceived as disabled. Currently, there is a four-four
split—the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that an
employee perceived as disabled is not entitled to reasonable
accommodation,119 and the First, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits hold that such individuals are entitled to reasonable
accommodation.120 The following cases illustrate the arguments for
both sides of the debate.
1. Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas
First, consider an illustrative case in which the Ninth Circuit held
that perceived disability does not amount to protection under the
ADA in the form of reasonable accommodations. In Kaplan, a peace
officer brought suit under the ADA alleging discrimination by the
city when it fired him because of a perceived disability.121 Although
the peace officer successfully proved that he was regarded as disabled
for purposes of the ADA, the court concluded that he was not
entitled to a reasonable accommodation for his perceived disability
because of the pervasive and troubling results associated with
accommodating individuals with perceived disabilities.122
In 1989 the City of North Las Vegas hired Frederick Kaplan as a
peace officer.123 In 1995 Kaplan injured his right wrist and thumb
during a defensive tactics training exercise.124 During rehabilitation,
Kaplan complained of pain in his right hand when holding objects.125
119. See Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231–33 (9th Cir. 2003);
Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186
F.3d 907, 916–18 (8th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th
Cir. 1998).
120. See Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2005); D’Angelo v.
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1236–39 (11th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous.
Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 772–76 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725
(2005); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996) (assuming, but not expressly
holding, that employers are required to reasonably accommodate employees regarded as
disabled).
121. 323 F.3d at 1227.
122. Id. at 1232–33.
123. Id. at 1227.
124. Id. at 1228.
125. Id.
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Despite numerous therapy sessions, Kaplan continued to experience
significant pain. Dr. Mark Reed concluded that Kaplan had
rheumatoid arthritis and recommended “a full duty work release,
with his employer to evaluate his ability to handle a gun.”126 Shortly
thereafter, Kaplan met with Dr. Timothy Deneau who determined
that Kaplan’s rheumatoid arthritis condition was permanent.127 Dr.
Deneau informed the office that Kaplan could not perform the
essential function of his job as a peace officer.128 Although Kaplan
requested an opportunity to qualify at the gun range—a necessary
activity to remain on the job—the deputy chief denied his request.129
Kaplan was terminated later that day.130
Less than a week after his termination, and on his own initiative,
Kaplan qualified on the gun range but did not request
reinstatement.131 Kaplan later testified that it was not until years later
that he recovered the ability to perform the actions that would
constitute his former essential job functions.132 Two years later, “an
independent physician retained by the City determined that Kaplan
never suffered from rheumatoid arthritis.”133 Kaplan filed a complaint
in federal court.134
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit had to resolve two issues to
determine whether Kaplan was a “qualified individual” under the
ADA: “(1) whether Kaplan was able to perform the essential
function of the peace officer position at the time of his termination
without an accommodation, and (2) whether Kaplan was entitled to
reasonable accommodation to help him perform the essential job
functions of a peace officer.”135 The court quickly concluded that at
the time of his termination Kaplan could not perform the essential
job function of a peace officer without accommodation.136 Because
Kaplan was asserting a perceived disability claim, the court concluded

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id. at 1228–29.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1229.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1230; see supra Part II.B.
Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1230–31.
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that he was not entitled to reasonable accommodation under the
ADA.137
Although the Kaplan court looked first to the plain language of
the statute, it was not convinced that a clear answer to the
accommodation question was available. Notably, the court said that
the absence of a stated distinction between the three alternative parts
of the “disability” definition was “not tantamount to an explicit
instruction by Congress that ‘regarded as’ individuals are entitled to
reasonable accommodation[].”138 Also, the court argued that a
“formalistic reading of the ADA”139 would lead to bizarre results.140
The court looked beyond the plain language of the statute, noting
that if it “were to conclude that ‘regarded as’ plaintiffs are entitled to
reasonable accommodation, impaired employees would be better off
under the statute if their employers treated them as disabled even if
they were not.”141 The court viewed this as a “perverse and troubling
result”142 and stated that
[w]ere we to entitle “regarded as” employees to reasonable
accommodation, it would do nothing to encourage those
employees to educate employers of their capabilities, and do
nothing to encourage the employers to see their employees’ talents
clearly; instead, it would improvidently provide those employees a
windfall if they perpetuated their employers’ misperception of a
disability.143

Although most circuits recognize the fact that some strange results
will occur when accommodating individuals with perceived
disabilities, some circuits are not overly concerned. These
unconcerned circuits rely on a strict interpretation of the ADA to
hold that an employer is responsible to accommodate those
perceived as disabled.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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2. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.
Next, consider a case in which the Eleventh Circuit held that
perceived disabilities do amount to protection under the ADA in the
form of reasonable accommodations. In D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods,
Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that employers are required “to
provide reasonable accommodations for individuals they regard as
disabled”144 because the ADA requires employers to accommodate
the disabled and the ADA disability definition makes no distinction
between one who is actually disabled and one perceived as disabled.
Cris D’Angelo was diagnosed with vertigo in September 1998.145
A doctor prescribed some antivertigo medication, but D’Angelo
started feeling better and did not fill the prescription.146 A month
after the diagnosis, D’Angelo began working for ConAgra. Over the
next few years, she worked in several divisions doing various types of
jobs.147 D’Angelo became sick only when she performed tasks that
forced her to continuously stare at a conveyer belt.148 In September
2001, a supervisor assigned D’Angelo to monitor the “box-former
belt,” which required her to make sure that the boxes on the belt
were properly formed.149 This work resulted in the resurfacing of her
vertigo condition, and she informed her line leader that the work was
making her sick and dizzy.150 The supervisor asked for
“documentation” of D’Angelo’s vertigo condition.151 D’Angelo
provided the plant manager with a letter from her doctor stating that
she should avoid situations where she has to look at moving belts.152
The plant manager met with Singleton’s Vice President of
Human Resources and determined that there were no available
positions where D’Angelo could avoid working around and viewing
moving equipment.153 D’Angelo was terminated the next day.154

144. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1222 (11th Cir. 2005).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1223.
147. Id. at 1222.
148. Id. at 1223. Although her first position required her to work on a conveyer belt,
D’Angelo’s subsequent positions rarely involved work with conveyer belts. Id. at 1222.
149. Id. at 1223.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1224.
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After failing to receive a response from a filed union grievance,
D’Angelo filed suit against ConAgra, alleging disability-based
discrimination due to the employer’s failure to reasonably
accommodate her.155 She claimed protection under the ADA because
she was both disabled and because her employer regarded her as
disabled. A federal district court in Florida granted summary
judgment for ConAgra after finding that D’Angelo was not actually
disabled because her “vertigo condition did not significantly limit
her in the major life activity of working.”156 The district court also
denied her “regarded as” claim.
The appellate court found that D’Angelo’s vertigo condition did
not significantly limit her in the major life activity of work and
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment against
D’Angelo on her “actual impairment” claim.157 In analyzing
D’Angelo’s “perceived disability” claim, the court first examined
whether D’Angelo was a “qualified individual.”158 This analysis
focused on whether working on a conveyer belt is an essential
function of the position of product transporter.159 The court reversed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim because
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether working on
the conveyer belt was an essential function of the job.160
In denying D’Angelo’s perceived disability claim, the district
court based its holding on the decisions of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits, which held that plaintiffs claiming they were
regarded as disabled were not entitled to a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.161 Therefore, D’Angelo’s inability
to perform her job as a transporter without an exemption from
working on the spreader and box-former belts denied her a valid
claim under the ADA.162 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the four sister
circuits and followed the Third Circuit in holding that individuals
perceived as disabled are entitled to reasonable accommodations.163

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
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In coming to this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit engaged in an
appropriate analysis of statutory interpretation, beginning with—and
ultimately relying on—an examination of the plain language of the
ADA.164
After quoting selected sections of the ADA, the Eleventh Circuit
logically concluded that the “ADA bars discrimination ‘against an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position.’”165 The court then looked to the statute’s
definition of “disability,” paying special attention to the word “or”
that separated the three “kinds” of disabilities: “A ‘disability,’ in
turn, is defined by the statute as either ‘a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual,’ or ‘a record of such an impairment,’ or
‘being regarded as having such an impairment.’”166 The court
reasoned that when one inserts this definition into the statute’s
prohibition, the bar on discrimination clearly applies equally to all
statutorily defined disabilities. The court stated that “[t]he text of
this statute simply offers no basis for differentiating among the three
types of disabilities in determining which are entitled to a reasonable
accommodation and which are not.”167 The court viewed the
Supreme Court’s decision in School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline168 as support for its interpretation of the statute.169

164. Id. at 1225–29, 1239.
165. Id. at 1235.
166. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(C) (2000)).
167. Id. at 1236.
168. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
169. See D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236. In Arline, a Florida schoolteacher afflicted with
tuberculosis claimed that her employer violated the 1973 Rehabilitation Act when she was
fired because her employer regarded her as handicapped. Id. 1236 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at
273–74). As part of its analysis, the Supreme Court interpreted the 1973 Rehabilitation Act’s
definition of “handicapped individual.” Id. Part of this definition, then codified at 29 U.S.C. §
706(7)(B)(1970), read that “any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment” qualifies as a handicapped
individual. D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236. Based on this definition, the Supreme Court
concluded that the schoolteacher was a handicapped individual within the “regarded as”
definition. Id. Recognizing that employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable
accommodation for handicapped employees, the Court remanded the case to the district court
to determine if the school board could have reasonably accommodated the teacher. Id. The
Supreme Court provided valuable insights into the “regarded as” definition when it stated that
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The D’Angelo court further cited to the ADA’s legislative history
that “expressly states that ‘[t]he ADA incorporates many of the
standards of discrimination set out in regulations implementing
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the
obligation to provide reasonable accommodations unless it would
result in an undue hardship on the operation of the business.’”170
Therefore, based on the plain language of the statute and the
insights provided by the Arline court, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the ADA requires employers to provide reasonable
accommodations for employees they regard as disabled.171
Just two months before the Eleventh Circuit handed down the
D’Angelo decision, the Tenth Circuit decided Kelly v. Metallics West,
Inc. and came to the same conclusion that the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation requirement applies to individuals regarded as
disabled.172
3. Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc.
In April 1996, Beverly Kelly began working for Metallics West as
a receptionist.173 Kelly was hospitalized in May 2000 due to a blood
clot in her lung.174 She returned home on supplemental oxygen, and
her physician cleared her to return to work about a week later.175
Kelly attempted to work without oxygen but “felt short of breath,
light-headed, and [she] had a headache.”176 She returned to her
doctor and received a note stating that she needed to use oxygen to

[b]y amending the definition of “handicapped individual” to include not only those
who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired
and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress
acknowledged that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and
disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment. . . . The Act is carefully structured to replace such reflexive reactions to
actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically sound
judgments: the definition of “handicapped individual” is broad, but only those
individuals who are both handicapped and otherwise qualified are eligible for relief.
Id. at 1236–37.
170. Id. at 1237 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 2 (1989)).
171. Id. at 1240.
172. See Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2005).
173. Id. at 671.
174. Id. at 672.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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work.177 Kelly told Michael Mola, Chairman of the Board of
Metallics West, that she needed to use oxygen in order to return to
work.178 According to Kelly, Mola told her, “No, there will be no
oxygen on the premises.”179 Upon filing for short term disability
benefits, Kelly received them from June 2 to June 19, 2000.180 Her
doctor allowed her to return to work without oxygen, but shortly
after returning to work, she began to suffer from headaches and
lightheadedness.181 After finding that her oxygen levels were low, the
doctor provided her a release, clearing her to return to work with
oxygen.182
Kelly contacted Mola on June 27 and told him that her doctor
would only allow her to return to work if she used supplemental
oxygen.183 Once again, Mola refused Kelly’s request to use oxygen
and stated “that he did not want the responsibility because she might
‘fall over dead.’”184 Later that day, Mola wrote a letter to Kelly that
she construed as terminating her employment.185 Kelly did not return
to work but instead brought discrimination and retaliation claims

177. Id. The note simply read: “Patient needs to use O2 at work.” Id.
178. Id. Kelly had also testified that she provided the doctor’s note to somebody at
Metallics West, but she could not remember exactly to whom she had given the note. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Kelly did not provide this release to Metallics West until her attorney contacted
them one month later. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 673. The letter stated:
Relative to our conversation of this morning concerning your absen[ce]. It appears
that your health situation the past few months has not improved. You have lost
considerable time and your words to me this morning is [sic] that you and your
doctor have not found the answer and you would either report to work with an
oxygen bottle or lose more time. Either condition does not make for a stable
employee. Based on this information, management in a meeting this morning, voted
to hire a new replacement for your job. This job of order entry is so critical that we
cannot do without a full time person. You will need to contact Ann or Shawn to
arrange your Cobra Insurance payments. Bev, you have been an exceptional
employee these past years and your professionalism and genial manner endeared you
to all of us. You are a very special person. If and when your health improves we will
try to work with your doctors and you for a safe return to us. As I indicated we’d try
to find another job within our organization that fits your talent and drive. We are all
praying for your swift and complete recovery.
Id.
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under the ADA against Metallics West.186 The trial court denied
Metallics West’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the
discrimination claim to proceed on the theory that Kelly’s employer
had regarded her as disabled and had fired her because of this
perceived disability.187 Metallics West moved for a judgment as a
matter of law188 on the theory that an employee merely regarded as
disabled by her employer is not entitled to reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.189 The trial court denied the
motion.190
After acknowledging the circuit split on the issue, the Tenth
Circuit followed the reasoning of the First and Third Circuits and
held that an employer must reasonably accommodate employees
perceived or regarded as disabled.191 Much like the D’Angelo court,
the Kelly court noted that “the plain language of the ADA’s
interlocking statutory definitions includes within the rubric of a
‘qualified individual with a disability’ protected by the ADA
individuals (1) regarded as disabled but (2) who, with reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position
that they hold.”192 The court looked to the plain language of the
statute, noting that Congress “makes no distinction between
employees who are actually disabled and those who are merely
regarded as disabled.”193
This circuit split, just like the split involving the “interacting with
others” question, does not happen by accident. There are strong
arguments on each side of the splits, and thousands of educated eyes
have looked at these issues. Therefore, in the search for logic, unity,
and the liberation of the mentally disabled, each side must be
thoroughly analyzed.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. This was done pursuant to Section 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
189. Kelly, 410 F.3d at 673.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 675–76.
192. Id. at 675.
193. Id. at 676. (“Can it be inherently ‘unreasonable’ to accommodate an employee who
is only regarded as disabled? Congress does not appear to have thought so . . . .”); see also 42
U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
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IV. WHO GOT IT RIGHT AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
This Part analyzes the two circuit splits and argues that the
Supreme Court should resolve the splits by recognizing that
interaction with others is a major life activity and by recognizing an
employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate individuals with
perceived disabilities. This Part then illustrates the importance of
such holdings for individuals suffering from mental impairments that
are making perceived disability claims. However, even if the Court
resolves the splits as suggested, this Part shows that the realities of
the present work environment are such that many mentally disabled
individuals will not be protected under the current rubric of the
ADA. Nevertheless, there are in fact additional ways to make
Congress’s goal of a discrimination-free work environment closer to
a reality.
A. The “Interacting with Others” Divide
Although many courts have hesitated to recognize “interacting
with others” as a major life activity under the ADA,194 the Ninth
Circuit came to the correct conclusion when it held that “interacting
with others” is a major life activity under the ADA. Supreme Court
precedent, the EEOC guidelines, and the overarching goals of the
ADA all suggest such a conclusion. Therefore, the Supreme Court
should also recognize “interacting with others” as a major life
activity.
Supreme Court precedent provides powerful suggestions as to
how a court should view “interaction with others” under the ADA.
In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court found that the term “major life
activity” was very broad and denoted “comparative importance,”
suggesting that “the touchstone for determining an activity’s
inclusion under the [ADA] rubric is its significance.”195 More
recently in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,
the Court noted that to be “major,” an activity must be “of central
importance to daily life.”196 One would be hard pressed to argue that
“interaction with others” is not of central importance to daily life. In

194. See, e.g., Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2001); Amir v. St.
Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 1999).
195. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998).
196. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
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fact, when compared to the major life activities most commonly
associated with the physically disabled—seeing, hearing, walking,
breathing—one’s weakened ability to interact with others carries a
comparable importance and results in a similar frustration. As much
as an unimpaired individual would shrink from going through a
week with limited ability to walk, see, or hear, such an individual
would similarly shrink from the idea of experiencing a week with
limited ability to interact with others, especially given today’s world
of personal communication and interconnectedness.
In addition to this Supreme Court language, the EEOC,
through its Enforcement Guidance issued in 1997, added
“interacting with others” to its nonexhaustive list of major life
activities that fall under the ADA.197 This addition was clearly
influenced by Congress’s goal to “combat . . . employment
discrimination as well as the myths, fears, and stereotypes upon
which it is based.”198 Congress has given the EEOC the primary
responsibility of enforcing the employment-related portions of the
ADA.199 The EEOC devotes countless hours to analyzing and
preparing guidance on how to implement and interpret the ADA.
Although the 1997 Enforcement Guidance was not a regulation and,
therefore, is not afforded great deference, the guidance should not
be taken lightly. One’s ability to interact with others is a significant
activity, and one’s limitation in this activity should not be
minimized.
Interacting with others is a significant activity that is of central
importance to the daily lives of most Americans. While the concept
may be vague, the Ninth Circuit rightly recognized that “interacting
with others” is no more vague than the “ability to care for
oneself.”200 Furthermore, the text of the ADA contains nothing

197. GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6. The EEOC could increase
the likelihood that the Supreme Court would recognize interacting with others as a major life
activity by formalizing this guidance through formal rule-making procedures. As a general rule,
courts afford a promulgated regulation greater deference than an enforcement guidance. See
Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1558 (2005) (“Under Chevron, we will defer to a
reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguous statutory language provided that the
interpretation has the requisite ‘force of law.’” (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576, 587 (2000))).
198. GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6.
199. Other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs, also have responsibilities under those segments of the law.
200. McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999).
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about vagueness as a test for determining major life activities.201
Interacting with others necessarily and naturally fits as a major life
activity.
The inclusion of “interacting with others” as a major life activity
clearly creates a few challenges in its application. As one author
noted, “it is hard[] to imagine how someone could succeed in
today’s global, high-performance, team-oriented workplace if he
were substantially limited in his ability to . . . interact with other
people.”202 Moreover, in this classification more than any other,
there is the problem of distinguishing between disabilities and
inabilities. “There are, truth be told, people in the workplace who
are irritable, quick tempered, cantankerous or prone to poor
judgment. The ADA does not, however, protect people with
obnoxious personality traits but only those who (in the case of
mental impairments) have a mental or psychological disorder.”203
The Supreme Court should recognize “interacting with others”
as a major life activity. Not only does precedent so dictate, but the
liberation of many mentally impaired individuals depends on it.
Lydia Phillips elaborated upon this and wrote, “In 2003, the World
Health Organization estimated that mental health problems in the
United States account for 35 percent to 45 percent of absenteesim,
an average of six work loss days per 100 workers, and an estimated
59 percent of the economic costs arising from injury and illnessrelated loss of productivity.”204 Based on these statistics, resolving
the split might do more than rightfully protecting the mentally
impaired; it may be a financially sound course of action.
B. The Accommodation Divide
The Eleventh, Tenth, Third, and First Circuits were correct in
holding that employers have an obligation under the ADA to
reasonably accommodate individuals they perceive as disabled. First
and foremost, the plain language of the ADA requiring reasonable
accommodation makes no distinction between employees that are
actually disabled and those merely regarded as disabled. The

201.
202.
at 12.
203.
204.

Id.
Michael Starr & Megumi Sakae, Mental Disabilities, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 22, 2004,
Id.
Phillips, supra note 13.
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Supreme Court has explained that a court’s first step in interpreting a
statute is “to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the
case.”205 The D’Angelo court correctly took a careful look at the text,
noting that “the ADA bars discrimination ‘against an individual with
a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential function of the employment position.’”206 The
ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.”207 As has been discussed, an individual
is “disabled” for purposes of the ADA if that individual meets any
one of the disability definition’s three prongs.208 The D’Angelo court
then properly inserted the definition into the statute’s prohibition.
Only then does it become clear that the ADA bars discrimination
“against an individual regarded as having such an impairment who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position.”209 As the Eleventh,
Tenth, and Third Circuits noted, “the text of this statute simply
offers no basis for differentiating among the three types of disabilities
in determining which are entitled to a reasonable accommodation
and which are not.”210
The recognition of an employer’s obligation to accommodate
individuals perceived as disabled is not only a logical reading of the
ADA, it is also entirely consistent with the overarching purpose of
the Act. Congress enacted the ADA in an attempt to provide
comprehensive protection against discrimination for individuals with
real or perceived disabilities. The “ADA is concerned with
safeguarding the employee’s livelihood from adverse action taken on
the basis of ‘stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability’ of the employee.”211 Moreover, the trend is
moving towards circuits recognizing this obligation to

205. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
206. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
208. See supra Part II.A.
209. D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1235.
210. Id. at 1236.
211. Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(7)).
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accommodate, as is evidenced by the 2005 decisions in the Tenth
and Eleventh Circuit Courts.
The Kaplan court also looked first to the plain language, but it
concluded that the absence of a stated distinction between the three
alternative prongs of the “disability” definition was “not tantamount
to an explicit instruction by Congress that ‘regarded as’ individuals
are entitled to reasonable accommodations.”212 This argument rings
hollow for many reasons. The Kaplan court conceded that the
ADA’s definition of “qualified individual with a disability,” on its
face, does not differentiate between the three alternative prongs of
the disability definition.213 Even if it is not an “explicit” instruction
by Congress, a court would need some justification to depart from
what clearly is the natural application of the disability definition to
the statute’s prohibition.
The Ninth Circuit believes it is justified by the “bizarre results”
that will allegedly result from a “formalistic” reading of the
statute.214 The Ninth Circuit stated that under such a formalistic
reading, “impaired employees would be better off under the statute
if their employers treated them as disabled even if they were not.
This would be a perverse and troubling result under a statute aimed
at decreasing ‘stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of [people with disabilities].’”215 Moreover, the
court noted that
were [it] to entitle “regarded as” employees to reasonable
accommodation, it would do nothing to encourage those
employees to educate employers of their capabilities, and do
nothing to encourage the employers to see their employees’ talents
clearly; instead, it would improvidently provide those employees a
windfall if they perpetuated their employers’ misperception of a
disability.216

Looking past the language of the statute should not be necessary
in the first place, and even if bizarre results were likely, it is not the
court’s prerogative to fix a law that might be poorly written.
However, even if one were to engage in such an analysis, the Ninth

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000)).
Id.
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Circuit’s arguments are unpersuasive. In response to the Kaplan
court’s concern of “bizarre results,” the Tenth Circuit responded,
[I]t is in the nature of any “regarded as disabled” claim that an
employee who seeks protections not accorded to one who is
impaired but not regarded as disabled does so because of the
additional component—“regarded as” disabled. This rationale
provides no basis for denying validity to a reasonable
accommodation claim.217

The Tenth Circuit also pointed out the flaws in the argument
that accommodation of perceived disabilities would “do nothing to
encourage . . . employees to educate employers of their capabilities”
or to “encourage the employers to see their employees’ talents
clearly.”218 The Kelly court noted,
[T]he real danger is not that an employee will fail to educate an
employer concerning her abilities, but that “[t]he employee whose
limitations are perceived accurately gets to work, while [the
employee regarded as disabled] is sent home unpaid.” That is to
say, an employer who is unable or unwilling to shed his or her
stereotypic assumptions based on a faulty or prejudiced perception
of an employee’s abilities must be prepared to accommodate the
artificial limitations created by his or her own faulty perceptions. In
this sense, the ADA encourages employers to become more
enlightened about their employees’ capabilities, while protecting
employees from employers whose attitudes remain mired in
prejudice.219

The approach and arguments of the Tenth, Eleventh, and Third
Circuits are better aligned to both traditional canons of statutory
construction as well as the intent of Congress in the ADA.
Moreover, this approach includes the mentally impaired with their
physically impaired brothers under the protection of the ADA. As an
EEOC official observed, “We don’t think twice anymore about curb
cuts for wheelchairs and Braille on ATMs. But I’m not so sure we’ve
crossed the frontier on psychiatric disabilities. There’s still so much
stigma related to the disease.”220 It is time to cross that frontier, and

217.
218.
219.
2004)).
220.
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Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 (10th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id. (quoting Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir.
Phillips, supra note 13, at 2275 (quoting Sharon Rennert).
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the Supreme Court can build the bridge by recognizing “interacting
with others” as a major life activity and by recognizing an employer’s
responsibility to accommodate individuals perceived as disabled.
C. The Splits’ Impact on the Mentally Impaired
The circuit split on whether “interacting with others” is a major
life activity under the ADA is a major obstacle to many mentally
impaired plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination. In addition
to proving a mental impairment, a plaintiff is not deemed disabled
for purposes of the ADA unless a court finds that the impairment
substantially limits at least one major life activity.221 Unfortunately,
most of the major life activities that courts historically have
recognized have been directed towards individuals with physical
disabilities. Therefore, persons suffering from common mental
impairments like depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia are
not usually able to argue a substantial limitation in the major life
activities of walking, seeing, hearing, or breathing. Although clearly
impaired, the only major life activity in which such individuals may
claim a limitation is the ability to interact with others. It is hard to
imagine that Congress did not have such individuals in mind when it
passed the ADA in 1990. Thus, it is critical to quickly resolve this
divide, because for individuals suffering from mental impairments,
such as depression or bipolar disorder, their only avenue for relief
may depend on a court’s recognition that “interacting with others”
constitutes a major life activity.222
While the Supreme Court’s recognition of “interacting with
others” as a major life activity appears to be in line with precedent
and statutory intent, such a finding by the Court would not, by
itself, guarantee that mentally impaired individuals will receive
adequate protection under the ADA. As was briefly discussed in Part
I, a mentally impaired plaintiff must often face the apparent necessity
of alleging discrimination based on perceived disabilities. This hurdle
exists because a mentally impaired person pursuing an “actual
221. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630–31(1998).
222. In addition to having (or being regarded as having) a physical or mental
impairment, a person is not “disabled” for purposes of the ADA unless that impairment
substantially limits one or more major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (2000).
Moreover, unlike the individual confined to a wheelchair who can clearly show she is
substantially limited with regards to walking, an individual suffering from a mental impairment
may not appear to be limited in a major life activity.
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disability” claim must show that she was substantially limited in her
ability to interact with others.223 This poses problems for such
plaintiffs because “courts have set the standard for substantial
limitation in the ability to interact with others in a way that makes it
difficult for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment.”224 Many courts
require plaintiffs to show an almost total inability to interact with
others in order to prove themselves substantially limited in that
area.225 In fact, “even among courts that accept the ability to interact
with others as a major life activity, the proof required to establish a
substantial limitation is so exacting that employees may effectively
provide employers with the proof needed to establish that the
employee is not otherwise qualified for the job.”226 Thus, by proving
the substantial limitation, a plaintiff may provide the employer with
the necessary ammunition to destroy the impaired plaintiff’s case. If
they have not done so already, employers will forcefully maintain
that the ability to interact with others is an essential element to most
employees’ positions—the very positions that the employees,
through their proof of substantial limitation, have revealed that they
cannot adequately perform.
Some argue that courts should relax the substantial limitation
standard so that plaintiffs would not have to show an almost absolute
inability to interact with others.227 Although such a course of action
would undoubtedly help the plight of mentally impaired plaintiffs, by
itself it would be insufficient. Such a relaxed standard would still
require plaintiffs to put forth considerable evidence showing a
substantial limitation in their ability to interact with others.
Employers would undoubtedly continue to use this evidence—
223. See GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6.
224. DeLoach, supra note 40, at 1337.
225. See Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc, 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that
even if the court were to recognize interacting with others as a major life activity, Soileau’s
ability to perform daily chores, visit pubs, and shop at the grocery store showed that his
impairment did not substantially limit his ability to interact with others); cf. Bragdon, 524 U.S.
624, 641 (1998) (“[The ADA] addresses substantial limitations on major life activities, not
utter inabilities.”).
226. DeLoach, supra note 40, at 1340.
227. See id. at 1341–43; see also Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life
Activity Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1139, 1143
(suggesting that “consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to
communicate when necessary” would set the appropriate standard for a substantial limitation
requirement (quoting McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir.
1999))).
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though not as damning to plaintiffs as the current standard—as proof
that the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the job
and, therefore, does not meet the standard of an “otherwise
qualified” individual. Even the adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s
language in McAlindin228 would require plaintiffs to provide an
enormous amount of ultimately self-destructive evidence. However,
this is not to say that a relaxed limitation standard would only serve
as a paper tiger. A more lenient standard could significantly help
persons with mental impairments that choose to assert “perceived
disability” claims as opposed to “actual disability” claims.
Under a “perceived disability” claim, an individual must only
show that the employer perceived the employee as being substantially
limited in a major life activity—that is, one’s ability to interact with
others.229 Since “perceived disability” claims still require a plaintiff to
show that the employer regarded him as substantially limited in a
major life activity,230 a relaxed substantial limitation standard would
appropriately aid deserving plaintiffs while limiting the damaging
evidence the current standard makes available to the employer. Thus,
“perceived disability” claims would avoid the problem of requiring
plaintiffs to submit evidence that undercuts their own claims.
However, even this framework does not provide the mentally
impaired with all the necessary protection against discrimination.
Unless courts recognize a responsibility to reasonably accommodate
individuals regarded as disabled, a legion of capable individuals with
disabilities will still be without recourse.231
D. Where Do We Go from Here?
Given the current landscape of the ADA mountain, with its
various cracks and crevices in critical places, one might ask, “Where
do we go from here?” As was noted above, some advocate legislative
action that would “restore the ADA to its original intent.”232 One
course of action that can and should be taken is for the Supreme
228. See McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235 (setting the standard for a substantial limitation as
“consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal or failure to communicate when
necessary”).
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., id.
231. See supra Part III.
232. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 1 (2004), available
at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/righting_ada.htm.
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Court to mend the circuit splits. Perhaps embedded in the question
of “Where do we go?” is part of the answer: we must go, we must
move, we must take action. Dr. Judith A. Cook noted, “The lack of
employment among consumers of mental health services reflects a
tremendous loss of productivity and potential for these individuals
personally and for our society economically.”233 Individuals suffering
from some sort of mental impairment are growing in number. It is
clear that the ADA mountain demands the utmost care and
attention, because like it or not, this mountain casts a wide and
encompassing shadow.234 The Supreme Court should mend the two
circuit splits by recognizing “interacting with others” as a major life
activity and by recognizing an employer’s duty to reasonably
accommodate employees perceived as disabled. Such a resolution of
these splits is entirely consistent with the plain language of the
statute and with Congress’s intent in passing this essential legislation.
Although a proper resolution of the circuit splits is critical to the
protection and liberation of mentally disabled individuals, such a
resolution will still leave many such individuals unprotected under
the ADA.235 One might then ask, “What more can be done?”236
There are many organizations dedicated to making the goals of the
ADA a reality, and many have attempted to answer this question.
The Office of Employment Policy in the Department of Labor has
“the ultimate goal of increasing the number of people with
disabilities who work, either as employees or entrepreneurs” and
provides education, policy analysis, technical assistance, and a variety
of programs and initiatives to reach this goal.237 The government

233. Judith A. Cook, Employment: A Workable Option Despite Mental Illness, 10
SAMHSA NEWS 1, 1 (2002).
234. There are roughly fifty million Americans with disabilities. One current writer wisely
noted, “Disability is a natural part of human lives. Sooner or later, it will touch most of us.”
Mary Johnson, A Long Way To Go: Judges and Others Still Don’t Grasp that the 15-Year-Old
Americans with Disabilities Act Is About Rights, Not Benefits, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 25, 2005,
at A11.
235. This is due to the fact that there are simply some jobs that absolutely require
interacting with others, and there are some disabilities that cannot be reasonably
accommodated.
236. Many employers might argue nothing more should be done. If an individual is
incapable of performing the essential functions of a job, with or without accommodation, that
person may just not be able to make it on the Mountain. This is harsh, but arguably the reality
of today’s work environment.
237. See U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Disability Employment Policy, Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.dol.gov/odep/faqs/main.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
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currently provides tax incentives for certain employers that
accommodate employees with disabilities.238 The Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration’s Center for Mental
Health Services commenced a study seeking to answer the question
“What do people with psychiatric disabilities need so that they can
successfully obtain and retain employment?”239 The Job
Accommodation Network has created an online resource that
provides suggested accommodations for all types of disabilities.240
These are but a few of the organizations that are working to
eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Perhaps
all that is clear is that there is not one answer to the question “What
more can be done?”
V. CONCLUSION
The Americans with Disabilities Act is designed to eliminate
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.241 This landmark
legislation prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified
individuals with disabilities and requires employers to provide such
individuals with reasonable accommodations. Since the enactment of
the ADA, this monumental mountain has become riddled with
cracks and questions. One major split involves whether interacting
with others is a major life activity under the ADA. Another
considerable crack concerns the issue of whether employers have an
obligation to accommodate employees perceived as disabled. The
mentally impaired are significantly affected by these two circuit splits.
First, many mentally impaired individuals can only satisfy the ADA
“disability” definition by showing that they are substantially limited
in their ability to interact with others.242 Thus, if a court does not
238. See, e.g., Disabled Access Credit, I.R.C. § 44 (2005) (stating tax credit is available
for small businesses that make their businesses accessible to persons with disabilities).
239. The Employment Intervention Demonstration Program (unpublished study) (on file
with the author).
240. See Job Accommodation Network, http://www.jan.wvu.edu (last visited Mar. 1,
2006).
241. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). “[T]he Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.” Id. § 12101(a)(8). A primary purpose of the
ADA is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” Id. § 12101(b)(1).
242. As discussed above, the majority of major life activities recognized by courts involve
physical disabilities.
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recognize “interacting with others” as a major life activity, a mentally
impaired individual—one that would be viewed as having a disability
under most colloquial definitions—would not be disabled as defined
by the ADA and is therefore unprotected under the Act. Even if a
court recognizes “interacting with others” as a major life activity, a
mentally disabled individual asserting a “regarded as disabled” claim
will still lack necessary protection if the court does not recognize an
employer’s responsibility to accommodate individuals perceived as
disabled. Consequently, a mentally impaired individual that qualifies
as “disabled” because he is perceived as substantially limited in his
ability to interact with others is still denied the right to a reasonable
accommodation that would allow him to secure a job or continue to
work. Fortunately for the mentally impaired facing these obstacles,
the plain language of the ADA, congressional intent, Supreme Court
precedent, and explicit EEOC guidance all suggest that such
individuals are protected under the Act.
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit splits by
recognizing “interacting with others” as a major life activity and by
recognizing an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate
individuals with perceived disabilities. Such holdings represent the
most logical interpretation of the ADA and will create a desirable
unity among the lower courts. Perhaps most important, such a
course of action is critical for the liberation and protection of many
individuals suffering from mental illness. However, what is also clear
is that any hope of realizing a land free of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities will require the creative and collaborative
problem solving of employees, employers, organizations, agencies,
governments, and every concerned American. It is argued that “no
matter how much legislation is passed, attitude changes cannot be
mandated. This change must come from within.” 243 This may be
true, but one should not undervalue the law’s influence on societal
attitudes. The ADA is a monumental mountain worth celebrating,
and where necessary, mending.
Matthew M. Cannon

243. Francine Bell, Editorial, ADA Brings Quasimodo Out of the Bell Tower, CHI. SUN
TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A17.
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